Despite the fact that the study of politics has become increasingly empirical, quantitative and "behavioral" in recent years, and despite the apparently increasing tendency to feel that whatever meaningful debate ever existed between the behavioralists and the anti-behavioralists has ended, should end, or at least has become irrelevant since a more sophisticated and empirically productive behavioralism now predominates in virtually all fields of the discipline,1 the methodological debate continues, diminished perhaps in quantity but not in intensity.2
munication, if not reconciliation, it is my intention in this essay to bring one of these issues into sharper focus, to show that almost despite themselves, some of the critics and proponents of the "new science of politics" have addressed themselves to the problem of concept formation, and that despite their proclaimed differences are talking at cross-purposes about a similar problem. Indeed, it will be seen that the conflict between the "traditionalists" and the "behavioralists" is utterly dependent-in the area of concept formation-upon an outmoded positivistic interpretation of behavioral science and a misguided reaction on the part of some political theorists to that obsolete conception.
Concept formation as a general problem in philosophy, however, is extremely complex inasmuch as it covers questions of definition, classification, comparison, measurement, and empirical interpretation. To achieve our immediate and ironic purpose, however, it is desirable to restrict the analysis to the questions of definition and especially of the criteria of classification to be used in developing the basic concepts of political science, concepts of the attributes of political phenomena. Not only is it necessary to resolve this question prior to engaging in the questions of comparison and measurement, but it is primarily on this most basic level that it is possible to see most clearly the nature of the misunderstandings held by the antagonists on both sides of the controversy about a behavioral science of politics. Once we understand how we develop criteria of identity and classification, problems such as comparison become relatively simple on the conceptual level and permit us to concentrate our energies upon the application of our concepts and techniques to the data we wish to compare or measure.
Bentley claimed, "is admittedly naive, as naive, I hope as the point of view of the physical sciences; I nowhere lay any stress on the difference between the conscious and the unconscious. statement, it should be observed, does not refer to the techniques of the physical sciences, or to the logic of scientific procedure in general. Bentley is stressing a particular way of looking at phenomena, a way of constructing concepts of the objects of inquiry in the science of politics. In a very general sense, Bentley's claim of epistemological identity with the physical sciences is quite justified. The "viewpoint" of the physical scientist is indeed not that of introspection, and color and sound have no meaning in his explanations except in terms of wave lengths, which are theoretical constructs interpreted in terms of the observed behavior of material entities.
Theoretical constructs interpreted in terms of the externally observed behavior of humans is the similar goal of Bentley's political science. For Bentley, ideas and feelings, like color and sound, may be immediately experienced by 'subjects but cannot be the "raw material" of a science of politics. What, he asks, are "the practical realities" for which these feeling and idea factors stand?
. . .we readily see that they stand for certain regularities . . . in activity stated as individual conduct. For instance, if a child is kind to its cat it is apt to be kind to its dog. We indicate the tendency by calling the child kind-hearted.
However, while these feelings and ideas put themselves forth to be definite dependable things, experience proves that they only conform roughly to the actual activity that can be observed . . . from the standpoint of the feelings we can observe nothing more than unreliable, poorly defined tendencies of activity to correspond to them. Kindness to cat or dog is not accompanied by kindness to snake or mosquito. their own conduct by the subjects themselves but rather must be constructs referring and corresponding to the external activity of the subjects as observed by the social scientist. "If we can get our social life stated in terms of activity, and of nothing else . . . we have at least reached a foundation upon which a coherent system of measurements can be built up."10 This is the position also of Charles E. Merriam, G. E. G. Catlin and other early proponents of behavioral political studies.1' Essentially the same position has been expressed in more recent polemic. David Apter, for example, argues for the development of "research theory" that is based upon concepts not derived from common sense. "Much of what seems to be a maze of jargon in social science," he points out, "is a direct result of the effort to cut through so-called common sense terms which, upon intensive probing, prove themselves to be of limited usefulness."1 Apter feels that the epistemology that is implicit in most political research has been that of "historicism," or the attempt to discover the ideas of an historical period and the "structures" in which they are expressed.'3 The historical approach, unfortunately, has placed undue emphasis on the uniqueness of an age and therefore also on the idea that the age can best be understood through participation in "the social processes on one's environment." Contrary to this approach, Apter contends that "the only way in which questions can be phrased in terms of their maximum significance is to articulate the body of research theory to which the problem is relevant."14 This, in turn, can best be done by de- veloping abstract models of interaction.15 The variables in these models, of course, will be only those which can be scientifically studied and which are significant in terms of the scientific problems which interest the scholar or the profession, rather than in terms of the political problems important in political life.
II. THE "OLD POLITICAL SCIENCE": VERSTEHEN AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EXPLANATION
At the opposite extreme from the radical behaviorists, who maintain the thesis that concepts in the science of politics are to be developed by the observer on the basis of his perception of the overt actions of his subjects, are those who have argued in favor of what is usually called the "verstehen operation.'6 Until recently there was little question but that the term verstehen referred to an explanatory technique, the "method" of empathy, or to the intuitive imputation of motives to human agents other than oneself on the basis of one's understanding of one's own motivation. It is the attempt to "understand" social behavior by imputing "springs of action" to the actors involved in it by means of an imaginative identification of the social scientist with the participants in the social situation under analysis. The "external" observation of social behavior, of "patterns of action," from this point of view is at best extremely limited in applicability, and at worst utterly fruitless. The political and social sciences, it is argued, should not, or cannot, be molded along the methodological lines of the physical sciences.
As Theodore Abel describes the "verstehen operation"'17 it involves the assumption that the social scientist has within the universe of his experience feelings or emotions which he has subjectively correlated with certain behavior he himself manifested in the past. The social observer also associates, often but not always quite logically, certain groups of value concepts with others-for example, a value concept asserting the value of life might be associated with other attitudes such as, but not necessarily, pacifism, An even more radical criticism of the idea of a strictly behavioral science of politics that is based on the notion that common-sense criteria determine the concepts of the study of politics has been put forward by Charner Perry. It is more radical because it assumes that the application of the scientific method to a given subject matter (2) represents the way the critics of verstehen deal with its meaning, that is, as a problem in how we know, in general, viz., by intuition or by observation. Type (3), on the other hand, assumes that the logic implicit in the physical and the social sciences is the same, and treats the term as referring to a problem in method peculiar to the social sciences. That is to say, granted that the logic of all the sciences is the same, nevertheless, social reality, the "object of inquiry" in the social sciences (interaction, intersubj ectivity, language) requires a method of observation (and therefore a type of concept formation) suitable for those objects, a method that observes actions as they are meant by the actors and not that observes actions with meanings imposed by the observer.
See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Action (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), pp. 9, 18, 22, 90, but esp. p. 88; Talcott Parsons, The to understand or to comprehend, and thus both usages are plausible. The interpretation of the term by Schutz, however, stresses the goal, or object, of understanding-the actor's meaning -rather than the process of understanding in the mind of the observer.30
This revised interpretation of verstehen, by treating the "subjectively intended meaning" of an action as a problem in concept formation within the social sciences rather than a problem of how we know in general, by intuition or by observation, makes it possible for proponents of the necessity for taking the meaning of action into account to agree with the logical positivists about the nature of the logic of the social sciences. Schutz, for example, agrees with Nagel that all empirical knowledge depends upon discovery through processes of controlled inference, must be capable of being verified by anyone who will execute the proper experiment, and that any method that would require the scientific observer to select and interpret facts in terms of his private value system would never produce a scientific theory.31 Nevertheless, he submits that to the best of his knowledge no social scientist of stature . . . ever advocated such a concept of subjectivity as that criticized by Professor Nagel. \'ost certainly this was not the position of Max Weber." And he goes on to assert that Nagel and Hempel . . .are prevented from grasping the point of vital concern to social scientists by their basic philosophy of sensationalistic empiricism or logical positivism, which identifies experience with sensory observation and which assumes that the only alternative to controllable and, therefore, objective sensory observation is that of subjective and, therefore, uncontrollable and unverifiable introspection.32 " This difference appears in the fact that the criteria according to which the student of politics ". . . judges that, in two situations, the same thing has happened, or the same action performed, must be understood in relation to the rules governing sociological investigation. But here we run against a difficulty: for whereas in the case of the natural scientist we have to deal with only one set of rules, namely those governing the scientist's investigation itself, here what the sociologist is studying, as well as his study of it, is a human activity and is therefore carried on according to rules. And it is these rules, rather than those which govern the sociologist's investigation, which specify what is to count as 'doing the same kind of thing' in relation to that kind of activity." Peter Winch, op. cit., pp. 86-87. If, then, the scholar's criteria of concept formation must come from the rules of action found in political life, his relation cept formation described above-namely, that classifications of social action must be in terms of concepts which are meaningful to the agent as well as to the observer-is therefore the only course of action open to the student of social behavior and institutions. But this in no way implies a non-behavioral position regarding the problem of verification. It is not that a different way of knowing (namely, "scientific" as against "intuitive") is at the basis of the differences between the physical and the social sciences, but that the object of knowledge is different. The social sciences must develop concepts of the intentional dimension of social reality. Thus, as Natanson recognizes, the "subjectivism" of Weber's postulate of interpretation does not mean that private, unverifiable elements are involved in the verification of hypotheses. As he quite correctly puts it, "it is concerned rather with the conceptual framework within which social reality may be comprehended."38
IV. THE PRACTICE OF CONCEPT FORMATION IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE OF POLITICS
The methodological principle that the concepts of the political scientist must be meaningful to the actor as well as to the observer is a principle that is exemplified in contemporary behavioral research without upsetting the verifiability principle. It would be impossible within the scope of this article to cite as evidence in support of this statement all relevant instances of empirical research accomplished since the turn of the century. Nevertheless, the conclusion that behavioral research conforms to this principle would seem to be justifiable if the two general types of inquiry, as illustrated by work which is accepted as representative by leaders of the behavioral movement,39 were indeed found to the practitioners of politics ". . . cannot be just that of observer to observed. It must rather be analogous to the participation of the natural scientist with his fellow-workers in the activities of scientific investigation. Putting the point generally, even if it is legitimate to speak of one's understanding of a mode of social activity as consisting in a knowledge of regularities, the nature of this knowledge must be very different from the nature of knowledge of physical regularities." Ibid., pp. 87-88. to conform to this principle of concept formation. Attitude Studies. One broad area of inquiry which has become prominent among behavioral students of politics has been the study of orientations toward the political process. In this area socio-psychological phenomena such as motives, attitudes, and opinions are analyzed and used to explain such types of behavior as party preferences, voting participation, and the psychological bases of political extremism. The individual is the source of these types of primary data although often the analysis is developed in terms of the significant groups in a given society.
The study of attitudes and motives (relative to political ideology) is conveniently illustrated in the research done in this area by Herbert McClosky.40 The report which describes these investigations into the relationships between personality attributes and conservative ideology succinctly and lucidly indicates that the procedures used in the formation of his basic concepts are completely in accord with the methodological principle which we have argued is a necessary assumption in social and political inquiry. Recognizing that the term "conservatism" is an important and common one in political life, and one that is used in different contexts to refer to the ideas of Burke, laissez-faire liberals, critics of the New Deal, or Republicans of any persuasion, McClosky admits that the definition that he has chosen to employ in his research, and the measure that was constructed from this definition, will not be satisfactory to everyone. However, the major point of interest to us is not the content of his definition but the manner in which he went about constructing it and the subsequent scales based on it. He began this construction by attempting "to extract from the tradition of self-styled conservative thought, and especially from the writings of Edmund Burke, a set of principles representing that tradition as fairly as possible. We have concentrated," he explains, "upon those attitudes and values that continually recur among acknowledged conservative thinkers and that appear to comprise the invariant elements of the conservative outlook. From these rather vague generalizations culled from conservative literature McClosky went on to isolate an "initial pool of 43 items" -that is to say, a tentative set of fairly brief and straightforward statements embodying what he thought were elements of conservative doctrine. This entire set of items was then submitted, "through survey methods, to a large general sample of persons in the vicinity of the Twin Cities who were asked to state, in relation to each item, whether they agreed or disagreed." This was done in order to select items which clustered sufficiently "to convince us that they belonged to the same universe, . . ." to reduce the number of items, and to insure consistency among them.42 With the twelve-item conservatism measure that emerged from the analysis of the results of this survey, McClosky found that he could rank people from extreme conservatism at one end to liberalism on the other in a manner very close to the ranking obtained using the original 43-item pool.
In addition, the procedures used to validate the scale, like those used to construct it, exemplify the methodological principle previously stated. In order to determine the degree to which the scale measured what it purported to measure, McCloskv submitted subsets of items from the twelve-item conservatism scale . . .to an advanced class in political theory, whose members had no prior knowledge of the study or its purposes. Each student was asked to supply a name or label for the group of statements and to write a paragraph explaining or justifying the label he had chosen. Of 48 students participating, 39 volunteered the word Conservatism as best describing the sentiments expressed in the statements, five offered names that were virtually synonymous with conservatism (e.g., traditionalism), while two supplied other names and two did not answer.43
Thus, just as MeClosky developed his original propositions ("items" in the questionnaire which defined the operational concept of conservatism) out of statements drawn from the traditional doctrines of conservatism, so he also validated the concept of conservatism by determining whether living persons who were presumably aware of the contemporary definitions of conservatism in the tradition of political thought and in American society shared the same concept of conservatism. Undoubtedly it would be possible for a "crude behaviorist" to claim that all that this study is based on is the assumption that a conservative is someone who is defined by a series of marks on a certain sheet of paper. "Conservatism is what conservatism tests test," one might say, echoing the well-known tautology about IQ tests. This, however, was not MeClosky's assumption. His introductory remarks clearly indicate his assumption that conservatism, like liberalism, is a set of ideas that are actually efficacious in orienting human behavior and have been, and are, historically existent. Conservatism is not, that is, merely a scientific construct, a classification developed in the minds of scholars in the hope that it might serve as an index of future behavior, much as a high score on an IQ examination seems to serve as a sign of future high performance in college.
On the contrary, conservatism is primarily a complex of notions that is actually operative in political life and MeClosky's "Conservatism scale" is an attempt to measure, in the sense of ranking, a number of individuals along what is assumed to be a real attitude dimension. By forming his basic concepts on the basis of the expressions of conservative ideas given him by both past and present social actors or agents who are active, at least intellectually, in political life, he has insured that his eventual explanations of political preference, belief, and affiliation are based on concepts which are meaningful to those agents as well as to the scientific observer.
Attitude studies such as McClosky's thus indicate how it is possible to form, through the development of scales, objective concepts of socalled subjective meaning-structures. In the science of politics, as in all empirical sciences, the concepts we are dealing with have intersubjective validity and are not merely introspective, and the propositions we are dealing withthough there is an element of verstehen in their constituent concepts-are verifiable through methods that are similar in all the sciences.44 44In addition to examining the contributions in the science of politics toward understanding the "orientations toward politics" which we have been discussing, Heinz Eulau's Political Behavior examines research done on the "agents and techniques of political power" and on activities going on in the "arena of political decision-making." The first is concerned with leadership studies, studies of the "mechanisms" by means of which influences are mobilized and transmitted. Often these studies are simply historical-descriptive analyses of social origins, religious affiliations, etc. See pp. 184-193. Where they are not, they are similar to the studies Participation Studies. Another major type of inquiry is that which studies modes of political participation. For example, in a research study done a few years ago to determine how the Standard Oil Company (N.J.) stands with the American public, it became important to also find out who are most articulate in their feelings about big corporations and most concerned to attack or defend them. Since it was necessary to segregate the people who are relatively active in relation to national political issues from those who are relatively inactive, it was first necessary to define what "political activity" would mean for the purposes of this study.
While we are not interested in the content of the definition, the procedures followed in developing it are relevant. In defining "political activity" the authors first wrote out a large number of questions which they thought would throw light on an individual's political behavior, and then they tried these questions out "in personal interviews with a test national sample of American adults. Some of the questions were found not to work well in doorstep interviews, and were discarded. Others were found to yield results so closely intercorrelated that one question could in effect stand for several others."45 For our purposes, it is important to note that some questions were found to mean the same as several others, and could, in fact, be used in place of several other questions. The criteria of identity utilized in forming this concept of "political activity" were developed in terms that were as meaningful to the agents as to the observers on two levels. The first level is the level of language which is shared by agent and investigator; and, while this point is often neglected, this is what makes it possible for the scientist to "rough-up" a set of preliminary questions with the assurance that they will have at least a min- imum of mutual significance and utility. But, secondly, we can also see in these studies that a conscious attempt was made to reduce the questions to the fewest which are most meaningful to the respondents, which most correspond to what they conceive of as "political activity." Aside from "face validity" (meaningfulness on the shared language level), the authors only claim that the resultant set of questions works well "in the sense that the questions are comprehended and answered with apparently little exaggeration by people of all educational levels and political persuasions."46 What does this mean but that the investigator and the agent both understood the meaning of the questions, and that the investigator in some way felt that he knew that the agent understood? Participation studies of this sort are relatively simple versions of the more complex studies which have come to be called studies of 'community power structure." While some of these studies make use of a certain amount of participant observation, they all depend almost wholly on interviewing. Included in the interview schedules are always questions designed to measure what Herbert Simon calls "beliefs as to where legitimate power lies." In a recent study of participation in a small community, for example, "the sample was asked to nominate others as 'generally more influential,' and influential in regard to school matters, local government affairs and community welfare policies. . . ." In addition, in regard to these same issues, the respondents were asked to designate potential policy advisors by asking them: "Whom could you go to among your personal acquaintances, or persons you feel you could go to, for advice as to what should be done in regard . . ." to these issues?47 The use of questions of this type indicates, again, that the political scientist wants and needs to develop concepts which are as meaningful to the agents as to the investigator. Answers to questions such as "Whom could you go to among your acquaintances for advice? ... " obviously assume notions in the mind of the agent asked about the rule or norm of behavior that he is following in this context. "Though I am not now in the process of actually seeking such advice," the answer might be, "I make it a rule to consult X." Even in those cases in which the answer must be descriptive of past behavior -as in answer to the question, "whom have you consulted during the past year on issue Y?"-it should be clear that the question implicitly assumes that the principle according to which X has been consulted about Y continues to hold. For if, at the time the question was asked, the agent or respondent no longer intended to consult X, the proper answer would be, "I did see X, but now I distrust his judgment and will no longer consult him." At that time, X is no longer an influential in this respect. Clearly, in no case do we actually see the agent consulting X, nor do we know that his visit is to be identified as "a consultation about policy Y" unless he tells us that that is the meaning it has for him and for X. This "meaning," since it involves concepts (normative), can only be "discovered" by having them expressed in the form of statements or propositions-which is why interviews and questionnaires are so widely used in the social sciences, and why anthropologists entering upon the study of some exotic society must learn the language and saturate themselves in the traditions and history of the society. The latter is the only way that they can understand the patterns of action which are the institutions of the society. "Patterns of activity," therefore, actually are normative concepts communicated to the investigators by the agents.48 Survey re48In a recent methodological study of anthropology S. F. Nadel wrote that it is invariably necessary for the anthropologist to go into the field and make himself "familiar" with the culture (usually primitive) that he wishes to study and overcome its strangeness by "something like an intellectual assimilation." Significantly, he stresses the fact that the study of the native language will probably have to precede the study of culture and social life. Since the meaning of terms and sentences of this new language cannot be gotten by counting the letters or words "scientifically" but must be learned, Nadel is obviously implying that before any of the "objective" controls used by anthropologists can be applied the investigator must learn the meaning of the concepts, and therefore of the institutions, of the new culture. S. F. Nadel, The Foundations of Social Anthropology (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951), p. 6. Underlining added.
It is also relevant to note the criteria Nadel suggests for isolating different types of so-called action patterns. "We have long held," he states, "that the order of things to which social institutions belong is built up through collecting together standardized action patterns on the grounds of their aim contents. . . . It might also seem that the people we observe themselves have names for these 'summaries' of related action patterns-'marriage,' 'family,' 'chieftanship,' 'property, ' Over the last century, however, psychologists found that a variety of phenomena appeared again and again in the midst of their traditional inquiries which proved embarrassing to the old single-stage (S-R) conception of behavior. These were symbolic phenomena, or "representational mediation processes." In their attempts to come to terms with these phenomena, Osgood points out that psychologists have produced a slow refinement in the rules of procedure by which they made and tested their "hunches" about what went on in the "little black box." His description of these developments is interesting, amusing, and succinct:
In nineteenth-century psychology the characteristic procedure in theorizing was to simply postulate a new entity or mechanism whenever some new regularity was discovered. Whenever something needed explaining, a new explanatory device was stuck inside the little black box, and it rapidly became chock-full of ill-assorted and ill-digested demons. For every nameable phenomenon of human behavior a different 'faculty' would be posited to explain it; for every nameable motive, a different 'instinct' would be listed as its explanation. Gradually it became necessary for psychologists to postulate some sort of intervening variable between S and R. They had to put some-thing back into the "little black box," as it were, in order to explain their observations. The contemporary behaviorist therefore has postulated an intervening or internal response-like process which produces self-stimulation. In other words, ". . . modern 'mediation psychology' sets up within the organism a replica of the S-R model, and it assumes that the same laws governing single-stage S-R process apply to both stages of the mediation model."53
Osgood goes on to develop much more complicated models of this mediation process, but the point remains the same. The observed behavior not only of humans, but also of animals, suggests that it is necessary to assume that often external stimuli arouse some intervening process which in turn produces a certain behavior-"problem solving," "learning," etc.,-which is partially independent of the stimulus. Osgood mentions several facts in both animal and human behavior which cannot be handled with a single-stage S-R model.54 The term generally used to refer to this intervening process is "symbolic mechanism"-but, though the phrase seems Hobbesian, the methodology appropriate to a study of symbolic behavior indicates that a mechanistic analogy is inappropriate. As Osgood states, this type of theory . . .places a premium on developing methods of indexing representational states, e.g., measuring meaning, particularly in human organisms. My own research . . . has been directed chiefly along these lines. Dealing with language responses themselveswhich, after all, are supposed to be 'expressions of meaning'-we have been trying to discover a limited number of basic factors or dimensions along which meaningful reactions vary and hence can be measured.' It seems to me that in "dealing with language responses" Osgood-and other modern behaviorists dealing with somewhat different problems-must operate in a context of shared meaning with their "respondents" or "subjects." That this is the case is indicated by an example given in Osgood's article of a study of abstract "assigns," that is to say, symbols or terms whose meanings are literally assigned through repeated association with simpler signs having direct behavioral reference. 
